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ECONOMIC CLASS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: A TIME-
SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE UK ECONOMY, 1955-2010 
 
Juan Carlos Cuestas1 
Bruce Philp 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants and dynamics of a Marxian 
surplus-value rate using quarterly UK data, 1955-2010, and the Johansen (1988, 1991) 
cointegration and vector error correction model (VECM). A conceptual model is introduced 
to define surplus-value and its component parts, before elaborating on theoretical issues 
which are important in estimating the rate. In the empirical analysis we seek to explain 
distributive conflict, paying attention to three forces which are traditionally seen as drivers 
of power in distributional struggle: (i) political party; (ii) the size of the “reserve army” of 
the unemployed; (iii) working class militancy. Our results suggest a positive impact of 
unemployment on the rate of surplus-value, and that falling working class militancy tends 
to raise the rate. Political party also affects the rate of surplus-value with a negative impact 
on the rate emanating from movement to left-wing government. This analysis demonstrates 
the ongoing relevance of Marxian economics in providing an alternative, robust and 
significant explanation of distribution in the post-war UK economy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with an issue of utmost importance for contemporary 
societies: the distribution of income between classes, defined by category of income.2 
Mainstream analyses of income distribution are usually constructed in 
methodological individualist terms, using rational-choice modelling, and focussing on 
the marginal products of labour and capital. In contrast it is a characteristic of various 
heterodox approaches — including post-Keynesian, institutionalist and Marxian 
economics — to focus on distribution in terms of economic classes (defined by 
income-source, i.e. wages, profit and rent), incorporating class power as an explicit 
driver of outcomes. In particular, Marxian economics regards surplus-value (to be 
defined presently) as an essential variable in the analysis of capitalism. And, in 
mature capitalism, we contend that such an approach remains highly relevant in 
examining distribution and conflict. 
 
Although Marxian analyses have tended to look at the capitalist economy as a whole, 
there are Marxian microeconomic approaches to distribution. One set of such 
approaches — originating with Roemer (1980, 1982, 1988, 1994) — focuses on 
Marxian exploitation theory (which is concerned with labour time) using the language 
and techniques of general equilibrium and game theory. Roemer emphasises the 
differential ownership of productive assets as the primary normative inequity in 
capitalism, and the traditional Marxian formulation of exploitation, in terms of 
surplus labour-time, is secondary. This work has spawned a critical Marxian literature, 
                                                 
2
 In this paper we have chosen to describe this as “economic class” since groups are 
defined and categorised by income flows. There are certainly social aspects to such 
class stratification, at least some of which are irreducible. Moreover some agents may, 
in a sense, belong to more than one class. This is discussed in section 2. 
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but there remains ongoing interest in Roemer’s seminal work (Veneziani, 2007, 
Yoshihara, 2010).  
 
In contrast to such a conceptual microeconomic treatment, the present paper adopts 
an empirical approach, using time-series econometrics and analysing distribution in 
macroeconomic terms. It is distinct from the aforementioned Marxian exploitation 
literature since it focuses on surplus-value rather than exploitation. This distinction is 
important because, contra Marx (1976, 671), the rate of exploitation can (and 
frequently does) diverge from the rate of surplus-value.3 The empirical methods we 
propose to use do bear comparison to a second strand of Marxian research which has 
focussed on long-run trends in the rate of surplus-value (e.g. Weisskopf 1979, 
Moseley 1988, Shaikh & Tonak 1994). These approaches reaffirm that Marxian 
categories have an explanatory role to play in explaining the patterns we observe in 
real capitalist economies. And, it is this literature which the present paper contributes 
to by using the Johansen (1988, 1991) cointegration and vector error correction model 
(VECM) to examine the rate, and evolution of, surplus-value in the UK economy, 
driven as it is by changes in specific macroeconomic, social and political forces. This 
quantitative Marxist approach (see Dunne 1991) focuses on class-based income 
distribution emerging out of the production process. 
 
                                                 
3
 Since the emergence of theories located in price systems inspired by Leontief, Sraffa 
and Arrow-Debreu, it has been possible to circumvent the problems of value which 
have plagued Marxian theory since the late nineteenth century. These approaches — 
described by some as “supply side Marxism” — focus on price in terms of the cost of 
labour and non-labour inputs, plus profit. In dynamic settings Marxist analyses have 
also explored effective demand and its role in crisis, examining the overlap between 
Marx, Keynes and Kalecki (see Trigg, 2006). Our “supply-side” approach 
concentrates on production. 
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The paper is structured as follows. We begin, in Section 2, by defining surplus-value 
in a Marxian sense, before considering a number of pertinent theoretical concerns. In 
particular the productive-unproductive labour distinction is rejected as an unnecessary 
artefact of classical economics (except insofar as public sector wages are not 
considered in the denominator of the surplus-value rate). Secondly, we recall 
Roemer’s (1994) argument for treating the self-employed, conceptually, as 
exploitation-neutral. Using analogous logic we maintain that mixed income should be 
removed in estimating the rate of surplus-value. In Section 3 we calculate the 
quarterly surplus-value rate for the UK economy, 1955Q1 to 2010Q1, and consider 
the variables to be used to proxy the balance of class forces. Before concluding, the 
penultimate section uses the Johansen (1988, 1991) cointegration and vector error 
correction model to examine changes in the rate of surplus-value as a consequence of 
changes in the balance of class forces, including the extent of working class militancy 
(measured by aggregate working days lost to industrial disputes), the size of the 
reserve army of the unemployed and political party in power. In concluding we argue 
that macroeconomic variables, reflecting class power, are significant (and important) 
determinants of the rate of surplus-value, and that political party is also significant 
with the Conservative and Labour parties reflecting the class interests we traditionally 
associate with each. 
 
2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
The notion of distributive struggle, formulated using Marx’s concept of surplus-value, 
is central in Marxian analyses of capitalism. The rate can be decomposed in various 
ways, in each case encapsulating distribution between worker and capitalist. We can 
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identify two broad explanatory approaches which have been adopted with regards to 
the Marxian surplus-value rate: 
1. Decompose the technical determinants (e.g. Gouverneur 1990); 
2. Estimate statistical relationships between surplus-value and class struggle 
indicators. 
In this section we will define the rate of surplus-value, relating the concept to prices, 
profit and wages.  
 
In order to define surplus-value let us take a simplified economy (for elaboration and 
discussion in the context of exploitation see Roemer 1988, pp.42-46). For a given 
technology { }L,A  assume that A  is an )( nn ×  input-output coefficient matrix and L  
is a )1( n×  vector of direct labour inputs used to produce each of the n  commodities. 
We shall assume the following: L  is measured by the number of employees working 
a given number of hours (the normal working week); the )1( ×n  vector reflecting 
(weekly) consumption by these workers (denoted b ) is purchased at equilibrium 
prices; these prices are given by the )1( n×  commodity price vector, p .4 Finally, we 
express the wage in money terms, written pb=w  
 
Given these definitions, and assuming that capitalists compete and only invest in lines 
of production that achieve the maximal profit rate, we may write the rate of profit 
from producing a unit of good i  as follows: 
 
                                                 
4
 The weekly time-frame suggested in this model could be substituted for months, 
quarters or yearly units, as long the unit of time which frames production and wages 
is the same. In the empirical analysis in section 3 the unit of time which defines our 
analysis is quarters. 
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Note, iA  is a column vector derived from the input-output matrix. Equation (1) is the 
rate of profit for good i , expressed as the price of one unit of good i , less the costs of 
producing it, divided by the same, i.e. the costs of the inputs (labour and raw 
materials). The equilibrium price vector is then derived as following: 
 
))(1( Lpp wAr ++=              (2) 
 
We shall assume that the rate of profit has a tendency to equalise as a consequence of 
classical dynamics (capitalists will always seek the highest rate of return); however, 
what the rate of profit does not give us is a ratio of the distribution of income in the 
capitalist production process, and it is this which Marx’s rate of surplus-value 
provides. Essentially the rate of surplus-value for a unit of commodity i , denoted iS , 
is the ratio of profits to wages paid in producing that unit of output. 
 
Using logic analogous to that in equation (1), we may write the rate of surplus-value 
for a unit of a particular good i  as follows: 
 
i
iii
i
wL
wLApS )( +−= p       (3) 
 
Note, the rate of surplus-value is only going to be equal between sectors in 
particularly unusual circumstances. Logically, in calculating rates of return from 
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producing a commodity, capitalists are indifferent between profits which are a return 
to an outlay on raw materials ( iAp  in the case of good i ), or those generated by 
wage-labour ( iwL ). Since the rate of profit has a tendency to equalise divergence in 
the ratio of the former to the latter, between sectors, causes deviations in S  across the 
capitalist economy. In this situation the rate of surplus-value will emerge as a vector 
reflecting differences in the ratio of iAp  to iwL  (which is analogous to the organic 
composition of capital, in the absence of fixed capital, in Marx’s system). On this 
basis, in formulating a rate of surplus-value in the capitalist macroeconomy, we 
derive the rate in aggregate ( S ), reflecting class-based distribution in such activity. 
 
This aggregate rate is equal to the sum of profits to wages paid in the capitalist 
macroeconomy (i.e. we exclude public sector wages which are generally paid out of 
tax revenues), where the constituent element unit levels are multiplied by an activity 
vector ( y ). If iy  is the output level for commodity i  we may write: 
∑
∑
=
=
+−
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i
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         (4) 
That is the rate of surplus-value (measured in aggregate) is equal to the ratio of 
aggregate profits to wages paid in the capitalist economy. 
 
There are two theoretical issues which warrant some consideration prior to our 
empirical analysis. First, in previous empirical estimates of the rate of surplus-value 
the distinction between productive and unproductive labour has been applied (e.g. 
Moseley 1988). Although frequently applied in Marxian work this categorisation of 
labour is not straightforward. Of the many definitions used (see Laibman, 1992), the 
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analytic definition — which defines labour as productive if it creates surplus-value — 
is perhaps the most widely applied in Marxian economics. It is also the relevant 
concept when estimating the rate of surplus-value. In this paper we treat public sector 
wages separately from private sector wages, examining the rate of surplus-value in 
terms of the latter only. However, we do not exclude the wages of certain private 
sector workers (e.g. accountants), considered unproductive by Marx, for the following 
reason: once a complex social division of labour has taken place it is arbitrary to 
ascribe the source of wages, or surplus-value creating activity, to individuals or 
particular subsets of the capitalist economy. Since capitalism is a system it is incorrect 
to define some employees working in the private sector as exploited, and others as not, 
when both groups may be receiving the same wage, with equivalent background and 
conditions. In this paper surplus-value is conceived of as a relationship between 
classes working within the capitalist subsystem. 5 
 
A second conceptual issue presents itself in examining a two-class model. The self-
employed (or petit-bourgeoisie) are empirically relevant. The conceptual formation of 
class has been discussed at length by Roemer (1988, 1994). Using microeconomic 
theory, and assuming rational optimising agents, he shows that five classes can 
emerge in a capitalist economy (where exploitation is mediated via the labour market): 
(i) pure capitalist; (ii) small capitalist; (iii) petty bourgeois artisan; (iv) semi-
proletarian; (v) proletarian. Capitalists are, in essence, employers: proletarians are 
employed. However, some agents — small capitalists, petty bourgeois artisans and 
                                                 
5
 An alternative approach to income distribution is provided by the Gini coefficient 
(for example see Roemer, 2008). This conflates wage and non-wage income, though 
such a measure has the advantage of being sensitive to wage inequality. The 
distribution of wages is an important intra-class issue. However, the purpose of our 
paper is to examine the inter-class distribution between wage and non-wage income. 
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semi-proletarians — are wholly or party self-employed. For example petty bourgeois 
artisans work entirely for themselves, hence they do not extract surplus-labour, or 
profit, from another. In this sense they are exploitation-neutral. Semi-proletarians are 
partly self-employed, but also sell some labour on the labour market. They are 
exploitation-neutral while engaged in self-employed activity, but are exploited while 
engaged in paid work for another. Hence, in empirically calculating S , self-employed 
activity (and remuneration) is removed using analogous logic, and we focus on wage 
and non-wage income derived from employment in the capitalist subsector of the 
economy. This is estimated using data derived from the Office for National Statistics 
website, and other earlier sources not available online. 
 
3. Variables and Data 
If decomposed there are various factors which can influence the rate of surplus-value. 
Changes in the length of the working week (for a given weekly wage) will change the 
rate, as will increased productivity as a consequence of technical change. Changes in 
the real weekly wage will also influence the rate. Another important determinant of 
changes in S  is change in the balance of class power, which impacts on it via the 
various elements in a decomposition. For example, when unemployment is high we 
can speculate that the rate of surplus-value will be high because employers can force 
workers to accept reduced wages and work longer hours. In this situation the cause of 
movement in S  is an alteration in the balance of class forces, and changes in the real 
wage and working hours are the mechanism through which surplus-value is increased.  
 
Although class relations may be obscured in capitalist economies today, there remain 
identifiable income streams associated with work and non-work (which is the basis 
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for defining class in this paper). Political and economic forces may also influence 
these income streams. It is the relationship between surplus-value and these forces 
which will be considered in the following section. In particular we will be interested 
in the following variables: (i) working class militancy; (ii) the “reserve army” of the 
unemployed; and, (iii) the political party in power. Prior to this econometric analysis 
we will consider the measurement, and data to be used, in calculating variables. 
 
The data sources used for each of our variables is outlined in appendix 1. The period 
investigated is 1955Q1 to 2010Q1 and this was determined, strictly, by the 
availability of data. For the purpose of estimation we define S  as the ratio of profit to 
wages, excluding the self-employed and public sector workers. Thus, calculated 
quarterly, the numerator is the sum of the gross operating surpluses of public non-
financial institutions, private non-financial institutions and financial corporations 
(seasonally adjusted, SA). The denominator is the total compensation of employees 
for each quarter, multiplied by the proportion of workers in private sector 
employment. The aggregate income variables used were in millions (£), at current 
prices. Since the proportion of workers in private sector employment was only 
available quarterly from 1999Q1 we interpolated quarterly observations from annual 
data using the method proposed by Lisman and Sandee (1964).6 On the basis of these 
measures S  is calculated quarterly for the UK, as presented in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
6
 In order to assess whether this procedure was reasonable we calculated an 
interpolated series (from the annual data) for the period 1999-2010Q1 and compared 
it to the quarterly series available from the ONS website for those years. Deviations 
were very small. The deviation of the predicted from the actual quarterly surplus-
value rate only exceeded 0.2 percentage points in one quarter. Specifically, in 
2008Q4 the interpolated level of S  was 56.07% whereas the actual surplus-value rate 
using the quarterly figure was 56.57%.  
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The first cause of variation in S  which we consider is the extent of working class 
unity, which we suggest is a partial manifestation of class consciousness. The 
capitalist strategy of “divide and rule” can, for example, be countered by trade union 
activity intended to strengthen the position of the working class in the distributive 
struggle. Union militancy is notoriously difficult to measure. In order to measure 
working class unity and “militancy” we shall consider strike action (measured by the 
number of days lost due to industrial action, M ) as a proxy for this. Some studies use 
the number of industrial disputes (e.g. Arestis & Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1998); 
we initially used this measure, but we derived no long-run relationship and we would 
also argue that it is important to give greater weight to disputes involving larger 
numbers of workers, especially since we are concerned with aggregate wages and 
aggregate surplus-value. 
 
The second independent variable we investigate is the claimant count. Since this 
variable is not available in an uninterrupted seasonally adjusted form for the period in 
question we have used the X12 procedure, available in EViews 6, to derive an 
adjusted series. The relationship between distribution and unemployment — or the 
“reserve army” — is a hallmark of the Marxian analysis of capitalism. In order to 
estimate the association between unemployment and S  we will use the claimant 
count, U , to measure the size of the reserve army of the unemployed. 7  We 
hypothesise that in periods when the number unemployed is growing the balance of 
class forces shifts toward capitalists, thereby facilitating a rising surplus-value rate. 
                                                 
7
 We do not investigate the causes of unemployment, though we may speculate on 
some of them. Technical change was one factor which Marx considered, and a 
tendency toward monopoly another (1976, pp. 781-794). Post-Keynesian approaches 
have focussed on aggregate demand and the role of investment (e.g. Arestis & 
Sawyer, 2005, Smith & Zoega, 2009). Since our paper is focussed on the supply side 
of the economy we do not explore such issues. 
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The logic of this is that when unemployment is high employers are able to force 
wages down, increase hours for those in employment (perhaps while shedding 
workers), or introduce new production methods. In other words unemployment acts 
as a bulwark for employers against workers, impacting on the elements considered in 
decomposition approaches. 
 
In examining the political economy of distributive conflict the political party (of 
government) is of interest because of the historical constituencies of the Labour and 
Conservative parties. In the UK political system the latter receive significant funding 
from employers, via private donations, while the former are largely funded by trade 
unions. Hence, traditionally, the Labour Party is seen as the party of workers and the 
Conservatives the party of employers. Of course, there are dissenting views on this 
from within Marxian social theory, where the State is seen as a regulator of social 
relations between capital and labour. The goal of the State, in these circumstances, is 
to ensure the continuance of capitalism. As such, the argument goes, we cannot 
necessarily assume that the Labour Party will support the working class any more 
than the Conservatives. Both may be seen as elements of bourgeois democracy, 
indistinguishable in terms of their effect on the working class. Indeed, it may even be 
the case that the Labour Party exerts more influence over workers than the 
Conservatives, and surplus-value rates may be higher under them than the latter. The 
relationship between S  and political party therefore becomes crucial in evaluating 
these two competing perspectives. In order to examine this we introduce the 
independent variable P , defined 0 if the Conservatives are in power, and 1 if the 
Labour Party is in power. A negative coefficient for this variable implies that workers 
do better, in gross terms, under Labour in comparison to the Conservatives. 
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4. Econometric Methodology and Results 
Given our theoretical model (outlined in section 2) and data sources (section 3), this 
section analyses the effect of M , U  and PARTY  on the long-run behaviour of S . 
The expected long-run relationships, discussed above, are as follows: 
                            PARTY)f(M, US ,=                             (5) 
In order to perform our analysis we transform S  and the first two independent 
variables into natural logarithms, i.e. lS , lM , and lU , and then apply the Johansen 
(1988, 1991) cointegration and vector error correction model (VECM): 
          tttit
p
i
it DumXDXDX εµαδαβ ++++Γ= −−
=
=
∑ 001
'
1
1
      (6) 
This has a constant restricted to lie in the cointegration space, 
},,,{ ttttt PARTYlMlUlSX = , 000 γααβµ ⊥+= , such that 0β  is an intercept in the 
cointegration relationships and 0γ is equal to zero. The coefficient 0δ represents mean 
shifts in the variables which do not cancel out in the cointegration space. Mean shifts 
are captured by a set of dummy variables, tDum . Note that this variable is PARTY . 
 
We selected the number of lags for our VECM according to the Schwarz information 
criterion (from a maximum of 8). This was in order to control for autocorrelation and 
delays in the transmission process. Based on this criterion we used 8 lags, which is 
intuitively reasonable given the distributional effects of a change in political party, or 
the impact of wage bargaining, may experience long delays. The baseline model was 
checked for signs of misspecification — i.e. normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity — and results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The hypothesis of 
normality of the residuals was rejected. However, because the normality problem 
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arises from an excess of kurtosis, the estimators by maximum likelihood are robust 
(Gonzalo, 1994). 
 
Table 3 presents Johansen’s stationarity tests. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 
5% significance level for r = 1. The choice of the cointegrating rank was made by 
looking at the trace test and roots of the companion matrix, which are reported in 
Tables 4 and 5. In this system we only have one cointegrating vector, although shocks 
have long lasting effects. The graph of the cointegrating relationship is reported in 
Figure 2, which mimics a white noise process. 
 
Next, we test for weak exogeneity of the variables and the results point to the non-
rejection of such a hypothesis for the variables lMD , DlU  and PARTYD  (χ2(3) = 
8.972, p-value = 0.03). This means that the error correction term will only appear in 
one equation, i.e. lSD . This result accords with our initial hypothesis, which explains 
S  as a function of the rest of the variables. Thus, the identified cointegrating vector is: 
              tttt PARTYlUlMSl )794.1()587.2()026.3()258.3( 088.0081.0055.0909.0
ˆ
−−−
−+−−=     (7) 
where the t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
In order to test for the stability of the cointegrating vector and the adjustment 
parameter we display the graphical representations of the Hansen & Johansen (1999) 
tests in Figure 3. According to these tests the cointegration vector and loading 
parameters are stable.8 We have also reported the impulse response function in Figure 
                                                 
8
 Following Hansen & Johansen (1999) the R representation of the test is more 
relevant since it keeps the dynamics fixed during the recursive estimation. Given that 
the representation of the test is below 1 during most of the sample period we conclude 
that the parameters are stable. For the alpha matrix the test appears to be stable only 
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4, where it is noticeable that shocks have long lasting effects on surplus-value. This 
implies that, after a shock, the variable needs long periods to return to the equilibrium.  
 
The results of this regression are interesting, indicating that the variables selected are 
indeed relevant in explaining the movements in the surplus-value rate. The first 
variable, working class union militancy ( M ), is negatively related to surplus-value. 
We can interpret this as indicating that prolonged and deep strikes over the period in 
question diminish the rate of surplus-value, increasing wages relative to corporate 
profits. As workers are more militant then days lost to strike action increase, shifting 
the balance of class forces toward workers, causing S  to fall.   
 
The parameter on the second independent variable, unemployment (measured by 
claimant count), is also as expected. As the size of the “reserve” army of the 
unemployed increases this shifts the balance of class forces towards capitalists, 
causing S  to rise. While our analysis does not demonstrate the mechanism through 
which this is mediated, we anticipate that this would be working through the impact 
on workers’ wage demands, pressure for cuts in hours, and the ability of workers to 
resist the adoption of new labour-saving techniques. 
 
The coefficient for PARTY is also interesting, supporting as it does the hypothesis 
that workers benefit in the macroeconomic distributive struggle when the Labour 
Party are in power. This undermines the claim of some Marxists that both parties can 
be considered aspects of bourgeois democracy, suggesting that policy reform, to the 
advantage of workers, is possible. There are further reasons to suppose that this result 
                                                                                                                                           
after some initial years. However, given that this test is a recursive one, instabilities at 
the beginning of the period do not imply the existence of structural breaks. 
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may actually understate the benefit to workers from Labour governments. For 
example Labour has historically adopted more progressive tax regimes, both on 
corporate profits and worker benefits (such as working family tax credits). This 
notwithstanding, the result of our analysis over this extensive period suggests that 
workers benefit in the distributive conflict in gross terms. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) it estimates the rate of surplus-value 
for the UK economy, 1955Q1-2010Q1; (ii) we show how the rate of surplus-value is 
related to various forces which, taken together, proxy the “class struggle”; (iii) 
contemporary econometrics is used to demonstrate the empirical validity of a 
Marxian model of contemporary capitalism; and, (iv) it has shown that mainstream 
quantitative methods can be applied to the Marxian case. 
 
More specifically, our results suggest that working class militancy (measured by days 
lost to industrial action) has a profound negative impact on the rate of surplus-value, 
as Marxian economists would expect. Secondly, the traditional argument concerning 
the “reserve army” of the unemployed — which links rising levels of unemployment 
to increasing surplus-value — accords well with the historical record. Finally, when 
we examine the empirical relationship between UK political parties and surplus-value 
we generated a result consistent with the traditional view of Labour and Conservative 
policy. In moving from left-wing Labour to right-wing Conservative administrations 
surplus-value tends to rise, thereby suggesting that the traditional view of political 
party behaviour is borne out  
 17
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Table 1: Univariate misspecification tests 
Test DlS DlM DlU DPARTY 
ARCH 0.086 0.897 0.038 0.998 
J-B 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Skewness -0.265 -0.168 0.543 -0.019 
Kurtosis 4.232 4.828 13.445 33.274 
Note: ARCH stands for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. J-B is the 
Jarque-Bera test for normality. For these two tests the p-values have been 
reported. 
 
Table 2: Multivariate misspecification tests 
Autocorrelation: Ljung-Box χ2(720) = 772.0 (0.471) 
 LM(1) χ2(16) = 20.33 (0.205) 
 LM(2) χ2(16) = 16.64 (0.409) 
Normality  χ2(6) = 1173 (0.000) 
ARCH: LM(1) χ2(100) = 140.6 (0.005) 
 LM(2) χ2(200) = 192.4 (0.637) 
 Note: p-values in parentheses 
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Table 3: Johansen’s stationarity test 
r DF lS lM lU PARTY 
1 2 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.002 
2 1 0.384 0.139 0.333 0.089 
3 1 0.584 0.101 0.138 0.492 
           Note: Restricted constant and weakly exogenous variables included in the 
cointegration relations. P-values are reported. 
 
Table 4: Trace test for the cointegration rank 
r Eigenvalue Trace p-value 
0 0.107 51.650 0.080 
1 0.060 27.490 0.268 
2 0.041 14.216 0.281 
3 0.025 5.342 0.257 
 
 
Table 5: Companion matrix roots (modulus) 
r=4 r=3 r=2 r=1 
0.981 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.981 0.983 1.00 1.00 
0.924 0.929 0.983 1.00 
0.924 0.929 0.926 0.921 
0.898 0.893 0.859 0.921 
0.868 0.893 0.852 0.845 
 
 21
 
 
Figure 1: Marxian Surplus-Value in the UK: 1955-2010Q1 
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Figure 2: Cointegrating relationship 
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Figure 3: Test for beta and alpha constancy 
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Figure 4: Impulse-response analysis 
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Appendix 1: Surplus-Value Statistics Quarterly UK  
Abbreviation Definition Source 
NHCZ Total Gross Operating Surplus: Financial Corporations (SA) 
 
Blue Book 
CAER Total Gross Operating Surplus: NFCos: Private (SA) 
 
Blue Book 
CAEQ Total Gross Operating Surplus: NFCos: Public (SA) 
 
Blue Book 
DTWM 
 
Total compensation of employees (SA) Blue Book 
DB37 Private sector employment as a proportion of the total. 
 
From 1992Q2 this data was available quarterly. Quarterly 
observations for the previous period were interpolated using 
the method proposed by Lisman & Sandee (1964). 
1955-1968 
Department of Employment and Productivity (1971) British Labour Statistics 
Historical Abstract 1886-1968. London: HMSO. 
 
1969-1991 
Economic Trends 268, February 1976. London: HMSO 
Economic Trends 434, December 1989 London: HMSO 
Economic Trends 458, December 1991 London: HMSO 
Social Trends 13, 1983. London: HMSO 
Social Trends 14, 1984. London: HMSO 
Social Trends 20, 1990. London: HMSO 
 
1992-2010 
ONS Website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ts-datasets.asp 
(Accessed 10/01/2011)  
Surplus-Value ( S ) (NHCZ+CAER+CAEQ)/(DTWM.DB37) Derived 
 
PARTY  Political party in government for all or most of the quarter. House of Commons Library, Social and General Statistics Section, Election 
Statistics: UK 1918-2007 (Edmund Tetteh) 
M  (BBFW) Aggregate strike days, quarterly, derived from monthly data. ONS Website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ts-datasets.asp 
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U (BCJA) 
 
 
Claimant count (UK) – thousands (NSA) 
 
Because of industrial action by employment staff the figure in 
December 1974 was not collected, so the 1974, Q4 figure is 
the average of the October and November claimant count. 
 
November 1976 was the same, thus 1976, Q4, was a two-
month average. 
 
Due to industrial action the January 1975 and December 1976 
are estimates. 
 
1955-1968 
Department of Employment and Productivity (1971) British Labour Statistics 
Historical Abstract 1886-1968. London: HMSO. 
 
1969 
Employment and Productivity Gazette. London: HMSO. 
 
1970-1978 
Department of Employment Gazette. London: HMSO. 
 
1979-1983 
Employment Gazette. London: HMSO. 
 
1984-2009 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ts-datasets.asp 
(Accessed 12th August, 2009) 
 
